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APPELLATE COURT JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j), as a case transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Utah
Supreme Court.
RESPONSE TO ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Appellant asserts that the only question before this Court on appeal is: "Did the
District Court err in finding that Plaintiff Home Abstract, a substitute plaintiff, did not
have standing to pursue the original plaintiffs quiet title action?" Appellants' Opening
Brief at 1. In fact, the question below was not whether Plaintiffs status as a substitute
plaintiff, standing alone, gave Plaintiff standing to maintain the quiet title action against
ORR Enterprises. Rather, the primary issue before the District Court was whether Home
Abstract had standing to sue even if it were assumed that Home Abstract stepped into the
shoes of the original plaintiff, Corey Vandenberg. As a secondary matter, ORR argued in
the District Court that Home Abstract lacked standing independent of whether
Vandenberg had standing to sue because Home Abstract produced no deed from
Vandenberg for the Eccles Property.
Summary judgment was appropriate on either of these bases standing alone, but
ORR's principal argument was that Vandenberg had no legal claim to the Eccles
Property, and therefore both Vandenberg and Home Abstract lacked standing. It is black
letter law that this Court may affirm the District Court for any reason appearing in the
record, regardless of whether that reason was relied upon by the District Court. See Hill
v.Seattle First Naf IBank, 827 P.2d 241, 246 ("We affirm a trial court's grant of a
4

motion for summary judgment on any reasonable legal basis even if not relied upon
below. However, any rationale affirming a decision must find support in the record.")
Because Home Abstract's appeal does not even address, let alone challenge, the
alternative basis for the District Court's order, the District Court's grant of summary
judgment should be affirmed.
STATUTES, RULES AND CASES OF IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1: "No estate or interest in real property, other than leases
for a term not exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning real
property or in any manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned,
surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or
conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering
or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7(c)(3)(A): "A memorandum supporting a motion
for summary judgment shall contain a statement of material facts as to which the moving
party contends no genuine issue exists. Each fact shall be separately stated and numbered
and supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials.
Each fact set forth in the moving party's memorandum is deemed admitted for the
purpose of summary judgment unless controverted by the responding party."
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7(c)(3)(B): "A memorandum opposing a motion for
summary judgment shall contain a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's
facts that is controverted, and may contain a separate statement of additional facts in
dispute. For each of the moving party's facts that is controverted, the opposing party
5

shall provide an explanation of the grounds for any dispute, supported by citation to
relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. ..."
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) (in pertinent part): "... When a motion for
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may
not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered
against a party failing to provide such a response."
Hill v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 827 P.2d 241, 246 (Utah 1992): "We affirm a trial
court's grant of a motion for summary judgment on any reasonable legal basis even if not
relied upon below. However, any rationale affirming a decision must find support in the
record."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case began almost four years ago when Corey Vandenberg, the original
plaintiff, sued ORR to quiet title to the Eccles Property. In late 2006 Home Abstract
substituted as plaintiff in place of Vandenberg. However, at no time did Home Abstract
produce or present any document establishing that Vandenberg's interest in the Eccles
Property had been transferred to Home Abstract. On the eve of trial, Home Abstract filed
a motion for summary judgment in which Home Abstract contended that ORR had no
legal interest in the Eccles Property. ORR opposed Home Abstract's motion and filed a
cross-motion for summary judgment, which accepted as true nearly all the factual
averments set forth in Home Abstract's motion. Specifically, ORR accepted as true
6

Home Abstract's contentions that (1) the Eccles Property was deeded to the Vanderdoes
Land Trust, and (2) the Trustee of the Vanderdoes Land Trust was Warren Brown. ORR
then argued that Home Abstract's claims failed as a matter of law because neither Home
Abstract nor Vandenberg had a deed to the Eccles Property from either the Vanderdoes
Trust or from Brown—the only two parties who might have had legal authority to deed
the Eccles Property based on the undisputed facts. ORR also argued that Home
Abstract's failure to produce any evidence of a written transfer to Home Abstract of
Vandenberg's interest in the Eccles Property was an alternative basis for the District
Court to conclude that Home Abstract lacked standing.
The District Court heard oral argument on the parties' cross-motions. During the
hearing counsel for ORR emphasized that the primary basis for ORR's motion was that
Home Abstract had admitted facts that demonstrated as a matter of law that Home
Abstract and Vandenberg lacked standing to sue because they had no deed from the
Vanderdoes Trust or from Brown. Moreover, counsel for Home Abstract confirmed in
response to questioning from the District Court that no document transferring an interest
in the Eccles Property to Home Abstract had ever been executed. R. 30 ("I have not seen
and I do not know, do not believe that there is a deed from Vandenb[e]rg to Home
Abstract.").
The District Court concluded that the facts material to ORR's motion were
undisputed and ruled that ORR was entitled to summary judgment on the ground that
Home Abstract lacked standing to sue. Home Abstract does not appeal or in any respect
challenge the District Court's finding that the material facts at issue were undisputed.
7

Nor does Home Abstract even mention ORR's principal argument below: that Home
Abstract lacked standing to sue because it admitted that the Eccles Property had been
deeded to the Vanderdoes Trust, yet Home Abstract had no deed from either the Trust or
from Brown.
FACTS RELEVANT TO THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The following facts are relevant to the District Court's decision to grant ORR's
motion for summary judgment, and were all undisputed:
1.

On or about March 5, 2004, Raymond and Valerie Vanderdoes executed a

Trust Agreement whereby they established the Raymond and Valerie Vanderdoes Eccles
Land Trust (hereinafter the "Vanderdoes Trust"). Home Abstract's Statement of
Undisputed Facts f 5 (R. 404); ORR's Response to Plaintiffs Statement of Undisputed
Facts If 5 ("Admitted for purposes of Plaintiff s motion and ORR's cross-motion") (R.
464-65); Tr. 34 (The Court: "There's no question that a trust was created.").
2.

Warren Brown (hereinafter "Brown") was identified as the Trustee of the

Vanderdoes Trust. Id (R. 404), (R. 464-65).
3.

On or about March 5, 2004, Raymond and Valerie Vanderdoes executed a

Quit Claim Deed conveying their interest in the Eccles Property to the Vanderdoes Trust.
Home Abstract's Statement of Undisputed Facts ^f 6 (R. 404); ORR's Response to
Plaintiffs Statement of Undisputed Facts ^f 6 ("Admitted for purposes of Plaintiff s
motion and ORR's cross-motion") (R. 465); Tr. 34 (The Court: 'There's no question the
property was put in trust.").
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4.

On or about March 5, 2004, Raymond and Valerie Vanderdoes assigned

their beneficial interest in the Vanderdoes Trust to Brown. Home Abstract's Statement of
Undisputed Facts 1j 7 (R. 404); ORR's Response to Plaintiffs Statement of Undisputed
Facts Tf 7 ("Admitted for purposes of Plaintiff s motion and ORR's cross-motion") (R.
465).
5.

Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint alleged, in pertinent part:
a.

Plaintiff negotiated with the Vanderdoes Trust, through Brown, to

acquire the Eccles Property through a purchase and settlement agreement. See Second
Amended Complaint If 35 (R. 302).
b.

Plaintiff paid full consideration as agreed to between Plaintiff and

the Trust. Id^j 36 (R. 302).
c.

Brown had a pecuniary interest in the sale of the Eccles Property.

Id 1f 40 (R.302).
d.

Brown fraudulently or intentionally misrepresented to Plaintiff that

Brown would hold title to the Eccles Property pending a determination by Plaintiff as to
how title to the Eccles Property was to vest, at which time Plaintiff was to record the deed
from the trust. 14 U 41 (R. 302).

9

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Home Abstract admitted in both its Motion for Summary Judgment and its Second
Amended Complaint that: (1) the Vanderdoes Trust was established; (2) the Eccles
Property was deeded to the Vanderdoes Trust; (3) Home Abstract's predecessor in
interest negotiated with the Trust for the purchase of the Eccles Property; and (4) Brown,
the Trustee of the Vanderdoes Trust, was to "hold title to the Eccles Property" until such
title was conveyed "from the [Vanderdoes] trust." It is undisputed that neither Home
Abstract nor Vandenberg now has or ever had a deed to the Eccles Property from either
Brown or the Vanderdoes Trust. Rather, the only deeds Home Abstract and Vandenberg
have ever relied upon on this case are: (1) "a November 29, 2004 Quit-Claim deed from
the Vanderdoeses to Wheelock, a company owned and operated by Corey Vandenberg";
and (2) "a March 25, 2004 Warranty Deed from the Vanderdoeses to Corey
Vandenberg." Home Abstract's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's CrossMotion for Summary Judgment and Reply in Support of Plaintiff s Motion for Summary
Judgment (R. 487-88). Even assuming that Home Abstract could establish its interest in
either of these deeds, it is undisputed that neither deed came from the Vanderdoes Trust
or Brown. Because Home Abstract admitted that the Eccles Property was deeded to the
Trust, and that Vandenberg understood that a valid deed to the Eccles Property would
have to come from the Trust, it is clear as a matter of law that neither Vandenberg nor
Home Abstract had standing to sue to quiet title to the Eccles Property.
The argument summarized in the above paragraph was central in ORR's briefs to
the District Court and in the parties' oral argument. Nevertheless, Home Abstract asks
10

this Court to review only a single question: whether the District Court erred by
concluding that Home Abstract did not "step into the shoes" of Vandenberg, the original
plaintiff, and thereby acquire his standing. Home Abstract's appeal does not address the
much more fundamental question that was very much at issue in the District Court: even
assuming Home Abstract acquired Vandenberg's interests in the Eccles Property as a
"substitute plaintiff," did Home Abstract's admissions demonstrate as a matter of law that
Home Abstract lacked standing to sue. Because Home Abstract does not address or
challenge this very obvious alternative basis for the District Court's decision, its appeal is
meritless and the District Court must be affirmed.
Moreover, even if the District Court ruled that Home Abstract lacked standing
despite its status as a substitute plaintiff, that ruling was correct as a matter of Utah law.
ORR noted in its brief (R. 471, fn. 2) and Home Abstract conceded in oral argument that
it had no written instrument transferring Vandenberg's interest (assuming he had such
interests) in the Eccles Property to Home Abstract: no deed, no assignment—nothing.
ORR pointed out in its memoranda (R. 524) and its oral argument that Utah law requires
that any transfer of an interest in real property must be in writing. See Bennett v. Huish,
2007 UT App 19 ^ 37, 155 P.3d 917 ("Generally, a conveyance of real property is within
the statue of frauds and unenforceable absent a writing."). Home Abstract never argued
that any exception to this general rule applied, and never came forward with any written
conveyance. Thus, whether or not a substitute plaintiff "steps into the shoes" of the
original plaintiff, nothing in the law of substitution of parties writes out of existence the
generally applicable law requiring transfers of real estate to be in writing. In the absence
11

of written proof of such a transfer, the defendant in a quiet title action remains vulnerable
to later claims from someone who takes a written transfer of the property at issue.
Accordingly, the District Court's decision should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED ON THE GROUND THAT THE ORIGINAL
PLAINTIFF LACKED STANDING TO SUE—A GROUND HOME
ABSTRACT DOES NOT ADDRESS.
Home Abstract does not address the fundamental basis for ORR's motion for

summary judgment: because neither Home Abstract nor Vandenberg had a deed to the
Eccles Property from either Brown or the Trust, Home Abstract lacked standing to sue in
a quiet title action. Instead, Home Abstract asks this Court to review a single question of
law: "does a substitute plaintiff, substituted pursuant to Rule 25(c) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure by an Order of the District Court, acquire the original plaintiffs standing
to pursue the original plaintiffs claims...." Appellant's Brief at 7. Home Abstract's
analysis of this issue presents a solitary argument: because Home Abstract was a
substitute plaintiff, it "step[ped] into the procedural position of the original party." Id at
10. However, Home Abstract never addresses the fundamental question of whether the
original plaintiff had standing to sue.
That question was at the heart of the summary judgment motion ORR filed in the
District Court; to wit: whether the original plaintiff in this action had standing to sue in
light of facts that both sides agreed were undisputed. Plainly, if the original plaintiff
lacked standing, Home Abstract's substitution as plaintiff did not cure this fundamental
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defect in the plaintiffs case. Indeed, if Home Abstract merely "stepped into the
procedural position" of an original plaintiff who himself lacked standing, then Home
Abstract likewise had no claim. Thus, even if Home Abstract "stepped into the shoes" of
the original plaintiff, the District Court's grant of summary judgment must be affirmed
unless Home Abstract can establish from the record that the original plaintiff in fact had
standing to sue. Because Home Abstract does not even address that question, its appeal
is wholly meritless and must be denied.
It is axiomatic that this Court "may affirm the judgment on any ground, even one
not relied upon by the trial court," so long as the "rationale for affirming a decision ...
fmd[s] support in the record." White v. Deseelhorst 879 P.2d 1371, 1376 (Utah 1994)
(internal quotations omitted). Here, the precise basis for the District Court's decision is
not clear. However, the record is replete with evidence supporting that decision on the
ground that neither Home Abstract nor Vandenberg had standing to sue because the deed
upon which their claims were based came from someone whom Home Abstract admitted
did not hold title to the Eccles Property. Yet Home Abstract does not even discuss, let
alone challenge, any of the undisputed facts or arguments that were presented below.
In the District Court Home Abstract moved for summary judgment based on
certain undisputed facts. In summary form, the pertinent undisputed facts were as
follows:
1.

On or about March 5, 2004, Raymond and Valerie Vanderdoes executed a
Trust Agreement whereby they established the Raymond and Valerie
Vanderdoes Eccles Land Trust (hereinafter the 'Vanderdoes Trust'). See
Statement of Facts, supra, ^f 1.
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2.

Warren Brown was identified as the Trustee of the Vanderdoes Land Trust.
See Statement of Facts, supra, ^f 2.

3.

On or about March 5, 2004, Raymond and Valerie Vanderdoes executed a
Quit Claim Deed conveying their interest in the Eccles Property to the
Vanderdoes Trust. See Statement of Facts, supra, ^f 3.

4.

On or about March 5, 2004, Raymond and Valerie Vanderdoes assigned
their beneficial interest in the Vanderdoes Land Trust to Warren Brown.
See Statement of Facts, supra, <[ 4.

Based upon these undisputed facts, Home Abstract argued it was entitled to
summary judgment because the deed upon which ORR's ownership claim was based was
a deed from the Eccles Trust, not from the Trustee. Home Abstract urged that when the
legal and equitable interests in the Eccles Trust "merged" in one person—Warren
Brown—the Trust lost the ability to transfer the Eccles Property because the Tmst ceased
to exist.
ORR then filed a cross-motion for summary judgment that accepted as true the
pertinent facts set forth in Home Abstract's motion, but argued that the legal effect of
those facts was not what Home Abstract contended. Rather, ORR argued that Home
Abstract lacked standing to sue irrespective of whether the legal and equitable interests in
the Trust merged because, under either circumstance, neither Home Abstract nor
Vandenberg had a deed to the Eccles Property from anyone with the legal authority to
convey title.
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First, if the interests merged as Home Abstract contended—and as the District
Court ultimately concluded (Tr. 3)1—Home Abstract had no legal claim to the Eccles
Property unless it had a deed from the person in whom those interests merged. The law is
clear that when the trustee of a trust simultaneously holds legal and equitable title to the
trust corpus, the trust is destroyed and the trustee holds title free and clear of the trust.
See 76 Am. Jur. 2d Trusts, § 90 ("Where the sole trustee has by subsequent events
become the sole beneficiary of the trust, the legal and the equitable interests merge, the
trust terminates, and the trustee holds the property free from the trust." (Emphasis
added)); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 341, cmt. a ("If by operation of law the entire
beneficial interest passes to the trustee, the trust terminates and the trustee holds the
property free of trust."). Here, Home Abstract admitted in its summary judgment
briefing that the legal and equitable interests in the Vanderdoes Trust were held
simultaneously by Brown, and affirmatively argued that, as a result, the interests in the
Trust had merged in Brown. See Home Abstract's Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment at 6 (R. 407) ("Upon transferring the beneficial interest of the
Trust, Warren Brown became the holder of both the legal and equitable interests of the
Trust."). Thus, the legal consequence of Home Abstract's admissions was clear: Brown
was the owner of the Eccles Property. Because neither Home Abstract nor Vandenberg
acquired a deed from Brown, Home Abstract's claims failed as a matter of law.

1

Home Abstract has not challenged on either factual or legal grounds the District Court's
conclusion that u[t]here's no question the trust merged at some point." Tr. 34.
Home Abstract argued below that it would be inequitable to conclude that any
settlement of the Eccles Property had to go through Brown, as either the Trustee or the
15

If, in the alternative, there was no merger, and the Trust was not destroyed but
remained in full force and effect, Home Abstract still lacked standing because it was
undisputed that neither Home Abstract nor Vandenberg had a deed to the Eccles Property
from the Trust. Rather, the only deed Home Abstract cited as a basis for its legal claim
was a deed from the Vanderdoeses, and not from the Trust or from Brown.3 Thus,
because a prima facie element of the plaintiffs case in a quiet title action is proof that the
plaintiff has a legal interest in the property at issue, Home Abstract's admission that the
Eccles Property was deeded to the Trust doomed its case. See Andrus v. Bagley, 775
P.2d 934, 935 (Utah 1989) (plaintiff who "had no interest" in the property at issue "had
no standing to bring the action"); Church v. Meadow Springs Ranch Corp., 659 P.2d
1045, 1048-49 (Utah 1983) ("To succeed in an action to quiet title to real estate, a
plaintiff must prevail on the strength of his own claim to title and not on the weakness of
a defendant's title or even its total lack of title.").

outright owner of the Eccles Property upon merger. However, Home Abstract had
repeatedly admitted in its pleadings that Vandenberg knew the Eccles Property was held
in the Eccles Trust, and that Vandenberg had in fact negotiated with Brown—as
Trustee—to acquire the Eccles Property through a deed from the Trust. See Facts, supra,
1f 5; Original Complaint (R. 007-8). Although Vandenberg knew that a deed to the Eccles
Property would have to come from the Trust, he never acquired such a deed because
Brown did not live up to his end of a deal with Vandenberg. Id Home Abstract sued
Brown because of this alleged duplicity, obtained a default against Brown, and has
merely to prove up its damages to have a fully enforceable judgment. See Ex Parte
Motion to Suspend Entry of Judgment Pending Quantification of Damages (R. 054-55).
3

Although Home Abstract later asserted it held an interest in the Eccles Property through
a deed to "Wheelock Holdings," Home Abstract presented no evidence to the District
Court suggesting that Wheelock Holdings ever transferred its purported interest to
Vandenberg or Home Abstract. This issue is discussed in more detail below.
16

The fact that Home Abstract was a substitute plaintiff was of no consequence to
the principal argument presented below. ORR's argument would have been equally
meritorious had Corey Vandenberg, the original plaintiff, still been the plaintiff in this
case. Indeed, because there was no evidence of any deed from Vandenberg to Home
Abstract, the basis for ORR's motion was that because Vandenberg had no deed from the
Trust or from Warren Brown, neither Vandenberg nor Home Abstract had standing to
sue. Thus, while ORR's motion attacked Home Abstract's standing by virtue of the fact
Home Abstract was the named plaintiff, the motion was plainly based on the original
plaintiffs lack of a legal interest.
Given how clear it was that ORR's attack on standing targeted Vandenberg as
much as Home Abstract, the contention that ORR "appears to acknowledge the fact that
the original plaintiff had standing to pursue a quiet title action against the Eccles
Property" is insincere. Home Abstract's Brief at 13. While Home Abstract's admissions
were central to ORR's summary judgment motion, it was Vandenberg's deeds—and the
lack thereof—that were plainly at issue. See, e^g., R. 469 ("it is undisputed that neither
Home Abstract not Vandenberg has a deed from Brown."), R. 471 (".. .Home Abstract
could not acquire any more interest than Vandenberg possessed, which, as discussed
above, was no interest at all"), Tr. 18 ("Undisputed that Home Abstract and any other
predecessors in interest have no deed from Warren Brown or from the trust." (emphasis
added)).
The District Court found in its written ruling that there was no dispute of material
fact. (R. 573.) Moreover, during the hearing the District Court specifically found that:
17

(1) "[t]here's no question that a trust was created"; (2) "[t]here's no question the property
was put in the trust"; and (3) "[t]here's no question the trust merged at some point." Tr.
34. Notably, Home Abstract does not challenge any of these factual findings. Home
Abstract could not raise any such challenge because each of these facts was averred to be
true in Home Abstract's motion, and ORR did not contest those facts. Under the clear
provisions of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7(c)(3)(A), "[e]ach fact set forth in the
moving party's memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment
unless controverted by the responding party." Because ORR did not controvert the
pertinent facts, but in fact admitted those facts, there is no possible basis on which Home
Abstract can challenge the facts that the Court held were undisputed. Moreover, Home
Abstract does not challenge the conclusion that the legal effect of those facts is that
Home Abstract has no actionable claim.
Home Abstract's contention that, "at the very least, the original plaintiff had an
alleged title to the Eccles Property" is unavailing. On summary judgment, mere
allegations are not sufficient. See Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224, 226-27 (Utah 1983)
("allegations or denials in the pleadings are not a sufficient basis for opposing summary
judgment"). As the plaintiff with the prima facie burden to show a legal interest in the
property at issue, neither Home Abstract nor Vandenberg could rely on the allegation of
standing to avoid ORR's properly supported summary judgment motion. See Utah R.
Civ. P. 56(e) ("When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided
in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the
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pleadings...."). Because Home Abstract acknowledged that neither it nor Vandenberg
had a deed from either the Trust or Brown, summary judgment was entirely appropriate.
Finally, Home Abstract's suggestion that the deed from the Vanderdoeses to
Wheelock Holdings provided a basis for its claim of standing is completely unsupported
by the Record. Home Abstract made this same argument in passing in the briefing to the
District Court. However, ORR pointed out that there was no evidence at all to
demonstrate that Vandenberg—let alone Home Abstract—acquired an interest in the deed
from Wheelock Holdings. (R. 523.) The only references to the Wheelock deed in Home
Abstract's briefs were a few contentions that were not supported by a single evidentiary
citation. In fact, the only evidence presented to the District Court about "Wheelock
Holdings" was offered by ORR to demonstrate that no such entity ever existed. (R. 523,
fn. 6 and Exhibit "D".) Home Abstract presented no contrary evidence, but merely
asserted without reference to any testimony or document that Wheelock Holdings was the
predecessor in interest to another entity that was controlled by Vandenberg. (R. 480.)
Unsupported assertions are insufficient to avoid a properly supported summary judgment.
Because there was a complete absence of evidence about the Wheelock deed and any
interest Vandenberg acquired in that deed, the Wheelock deed provided no basis on
which the District Court could have denied ORR's summary judgment motion.
To avoid a properly supported motion for summary judgment a party must submit
affidavits or other admissible evidence with its opposition papers. See Smith v. Four
Corners Mental Health Center, Inc., 2003 UT 23, f 70 P.3d 904 ("Once the moving party
has presented sufficient evidence to support the claim for judgment as a matter of law, the
19

burden shifts to the non-moving party to provide evidence creating an issue of material
fact. ... Therefore, when the moving party has presented evidence sufficient to support a
judgment in its favor, and the opposing party fails to submit contrary evidence, a trial
court is justified in concluding that no genuine issue of fact is present or would be at
trial.")- R u l e 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure mandates that, "[f]or each of the
moving party's facts that is controverted, the opposing party shall provide an explanation
of the grounds for any dispute, supported by citation to relevant materials, such as
affidavits or discovery materials" Because the issue raised by ORR's motion was Home
Abstract's and Vandenberg's lack of interest in the Eccles Property, Home Abstract was
required to come forward with evidence to prove it did in fact possess such an interest. It
was not enough for Home Abstract simply to aver that such an interest exists by virtue of
a deed to which it was not a party.

20

II.

BECAUSE UTAH LAW REQUIRES THAT TRANSFERS OF INTERESTS
IN REAL PROPERTY BE IN WRITING, THE ABSENCE OF ANY
WRITTEN TRANSFER OF VANDENBERG'S INTERESTS IN THE
ECCLES PROPERTY WAS FATAL TO HOME ABSTRACT'S CLAIMS.
If this Court was to ignore the alternative basis for the District Court's grant of

summary judgment and address only the limited issue briefed by Home Abstract, the
District Court's decision should still be affirmed. The bulk of Home Abstract's argument
consists of string citations to out-of-state court decisions opining generally that a
substitute plaintiff "steps into the shoes"—procedurally speaking—of the original
plaintiff. Those cases address questions not presented here, and are thus not even
persuasive authority on the narrow issue Home Abstract has appealed. See, e.g., Ransom
v. Brennan, 437 F.2d 513 (5 Cir. 1971) (addressing whether subject matter jurisdiction
"remains intact after substitution" under Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(a)(1)); Brook, Weiner, Sered,
Kreger & Weinberg, 53 F.3d 851 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that substitute plaintiff was
bound by original plaintiffs consent to appointment of magistrate); Freeport-McMoran,
Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426 (1991) (substitution of non-diverse party did not
destroy subject matter jurisdiction). Indeed, Home Abstract acknowledges repeatedly in
its brief that only the procedural aspects of a case remain the same following substitution.
Notably, Home Abstract has not cited a single case in Utah—or in any
jurisdiction—holding that a general substantive rule requiring transfers of real property to
be in writing is trumped by a rule of civil procedure governing substitution of parties.
See Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 ("No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for
a term not exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning real property or
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in any manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or
declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing
subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same,
or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.").4
Instead, Home Abstract cites cases suggesting that substitution is proper once an
actual transfer of an interest in the property at issue can be established. It is undisputed
that no such transfer was established here, and although Home Abstract could have
provided written proof of a transfer an any time, including the hearing, it did not do so.
In fact, when counsel for Home Abstract was asked at oral argument whether he was
aware of any deed from Vandenberg to Home Abstract, counsel responded: "I don't
believe there is, Your Honor. ... I have not seen and do not know, do not believe that
there is a deed from Vandenb[e]rg to Home Abstract. The arrangement of him, of Home
Abstract taking over Cor[e]y Vandenb[e]rg's claims was all done verbally." Tr. 30.
The cases Home Abstract identifies as "determinative" in its brief are both nonbinding because they are not Utah appellate court cases, and distinguishable in key
particulars. For example, Home Abstract cites the Connecticut case of Investors
Mortgage Co. v. Rodia, 625 A.2d 833 (Conn. App. 1993), for the proposition that, "when
there is no objection from the non-substituting party to the granting of a motion for
substitution, the non-substituting party is barred from later objecting to the substitution."

4

Although ORR raised the statute of frauds issue below, Home Abstract did not argue
below or on appeal, and has presented no evidence to suggest, that any of the recognized
exceptions to the statute of frauds (e.g., part performance) applied on the facts of this
case.
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Home Abstract's Brief at 9-10. Here, ORR's summary judgment motion was not an
"objection to the substitution," but was a challenge to Home Abstract's legal standing
based on the absence of a deed. In Investors Mortgage, it was undisputed that the
original plaintiff "transferred the subject premises by quitclaim deed to the substitute
plaintiff...." 625 A.2d at 478. See also id. at 483 (original plaintiff "conveyed legal title
to the premises, via quitclaim deed" to the substitute plaintiff). Here, in contrast, Home
Abstract admits that it has no deed to the Eccles Property from the original plaintiff, and
it is the absence of such a deed that is fatal to Home Abstract's claims.
Furthermore, Home Abstract did not cite in its brief or mention in oral argument
any authority for the proposition that the mere substitution of a party plaintiff obviates the
plaintiffs prima facie substantive burden of establishing a legal interest in the real
property at issue. Home Abstract merely argued that the substitute plaintiff "steps into
the shoes" of the original plaintiff for procedural purposes, but did not explain or offer
legal support for the position now asserted that a substitute plaintiff in a quiet title action
need not establish a substantive legal interest in the property at issue, even though every
other plaintiff in such an action must do so.5

The parenthetical Home Abstract provided for one of the cases it cited is illustrative of
this substantive/procedural distinction. Home Abstract cites Looney v. Raby, 2007 Ark.
App. LEXIS 778 (2007) for the proposition that, "substitution shall have the same effect
as if the action had been commenced in the name of the real party in interest." Home
Abstract's Brief at 11. Here, had Home Abstract commenced this action in its own name,
Home Abstract plainly would have borne the burden of proving it had a legal interest in
the Eccles Property, and such interest would have to have been conveyed in writing.
Home Abstract should not and does not occupy a position more advantageous than other
plaintiffs in quiet title suits simply because it was a substitute plaintiff.
23

The complications that could arise from such a rule of law are manifest. Most
significantly, if a substitute plaintiff were not required to provide written proof that it
acquired the original plaintiffs entire interest in the property, there would be nothing to
protect the defendant from a third-party later coming forward and claiming it acquired an
interest from the original plaintiff, and thus challenging anew the defendant's title. It is
precisely these concerns about the uncertainty of legal title and the potential for an
endless stream of lawsuits that underlie the statue of frauds' requirement that transfers of
interests in real estate be in writing.
Home Abstract had ample time to produce a deed to the Eccles Property. Its
failure to do so remains unexplained, and the absence of such a deed is fatal to Home
Abstract's claims. The District Court's grant of summary judgment should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
Home Abstract admitted facts that demonstrated as a matter of law it had no valid
deed to the Eccles Property. Home Abstract's failure to address, let alone challenge, this
alternative basis for the District Court's decision is fatal to Home Abstract's appeal.
Regardless, because Home Abstract admitted it had no written transfer of Vandenberg's
interests in the Eccles Property, Home Abstract could not establish standing to sue. For
both of these independent reasons, Home Abstract's appeal should be denied and the
District Court's grant of summary judgment should be AFFIRMED.
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 33, ORR respectfully requests that
this Court enter an order requiring Home Abstract to pay ORR's reasonable attorney fees
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incurred in connection with this appeal. ORR submits that the appeal is frivolous
because Home Abstract failed to challenge at all an alternative basis for the District
Court's decision, which was the principal focus of ORR's briefs in the District Court, and
which was based upon facts that Home Abstract admitted in its own summary judgment
motion.
Dated this ^ _ day of March, 2008.
YOUN^sHOFFMAN^

SSBERG & ENSOR, LLP

Evan S. qtrassberg
Counsel f^r Orr Enterprises, Inc. \
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this j ^ d a y of March, 2008,1 caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document to be sent by first class mail, postage prepaid, to
the following:

Timothy W. Blackburn
Richard H. Reeve
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY
2404 Washington Blvd., Suite 900
Ogden,UT 84401
^
f -v

Evan S. Strass
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